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Abstract 
The world of counterfeit goods is diverse and has grown rapidly throughout the years. The boom 
of e-commerce has resulted in a devastating increase in the shipment of small packages into the 
United States, making it easier for every day consumers to be fooled by counterfeiting 
masterminds. Counterfeit goods are not limited to fake watches and designer purses offered on 
the streets of Los Angeles or New York City anymore, instead the market has expanded to 
include many goods like consumer electronics, footwear, apparel, cosmetics, and even medicines 
and personal care items. Advances in technology at border control points, advertising campaigns 
that promote the negative effects of counterfeiting to educate consumers, and industry leaders 
having more control over their suppliers are some of the many effective strategies in the fight 
against counterfeiting, but what about the effects of international trade and the role of tariffs. 
This paper examines the relationship between import tariffs and the flow of industrial (non-
agricultural) counterfeit goods into the United States. 
1. The World of Counterfeit Goods
1.1 Background
The International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) defines counterfeiting as a federal 
and state crime that involves the manufacturing or distribution of goods under someone else’s 
name without their permission. The IACC states that counterfeit goods are usually made from 
lower quality components, and sold to imitate similar goods that are produced by brands that 
consumers know and trust. To put it simply, counterfeit goods are fake goods that are sold 
illegally. Many steps have been taken by the IACC, the US Department of Homeland Security, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), etc., to 
combat the counterfeit goods crisis; however, their efforts are not enough to stop this trillion 
dollar industry. Demand and supply side actions can, and are, being taken to reduce the amount 
of counterfeit goods entering the US, but what impact do tariffs make on the rate of trade in this 
illegal market? 
This paper will focus on the impact of tariffs on counterfeit goods with respect to data on 
trade and tariffs between the United States and China. China is the source of the highest amount 
of customs seizures for counterfeit goods; therefore, this paper investigates the impact of the 
trade wars between the United States and China on the amount of counterfeit goods entering the 
United States. I used data on the annual seizures of counterfeit goods as a reference for the level 
of counterfeiting taking place. It is difficult to calculate the estimated production of 
counterfeiting each year because this is an illegal market; therefore, I chose to use seizure data. 
Annual seizures fluctuate for many reasons such as; an increase in border security and 
technology, track and trace tactics, and efforts to track down counterfeiters from legitimate 
manufacturers. Understanding that many things impact the level of annual seizures, this research 
presents data that shows an inverse relationship exists between import tariffs that are imposed on 
goods entering the US from China, and counterfeit goods in the Apparel (Clothing and Textiles) 
product segment. 
2. Literature Review
2.1 Growth of Counterfeit Goods
Trade in counterfeit and pirated physical goods is an estimated $1.7 trillion a year 
industry (International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, 2019). In 2013, the value of imported fake 
goods worldwide was $461B (Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic 
Impact, 2016) and just three years later in 2016, that number grew to a staggering $509B (Trends 
in Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 2019). Counterfeit goods range from apparel and 
clothing accessories, footwear, and toys to goods that can physically harm consumers like fake 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, auto parts, and skincare products. Consumers aren’t the only ones at 
a loss when it comes to counterfeit goods, the International Chamber of Commerce projects that 
globally, net job loss will be between 4.2 to 5.4 million by 2022 due to counterfeiting and piracy 
(Economics, 2016). With no end in site, trade in counterfeit and pirated physical goods continues 
to steadily rise, representing 3.3% of global trade (OECD, 2019). 
As online shopping becomes a staple in households across America, counterfeit goods 
are finding their way into consumer hands at an alarming rate. Third-party platforms are an ideal 
method of transaction for counterfeiters due to the ease of access to consumers and the lack of 
control from legitimate brands to police fake goods. The popularity of e-commerce has led to a 
sharp increase in the shipment of small packages into the United States (US Customs and Border 
Protection, 2018). Consumers can purchase items that are delivered straight to their doors, often 
without the proper security screening due to the sheer amount of packages that move through 
commercial postal carriers. 
US companies that are trying to protect their products and fight the production and sale of 
counterfeit goods often find themselves at a loss. Manufacturers of counterfeit goods can be 
difficult to track because they often use shell companies and ship their products from sub-
contractors to avoid detection. Legal action is very difficult for American companies because e-
commerce counterfeiters are usually located outside of the US jurisdiction, often residing in 
China (Homeland Security, 2020). 
2.2 Trade with China 
China is currently the United States’ largest trader of goods. In 2018, total trade with 
China was worth an estimated $659.8B with exports totaling $120.3B and imports of $539.5B, a 
deficit of $419.2B (The People’s Republic of China, 2020). Figure 1, from BBC News, shows 
the trade deficit between the United States and China from 1985 to 2018. The top import 
categories of goods from China in 2018 were: electrical machinery, machinery, furniture and 
bedding, toys and sports equipment, and plastics. US imports from China accounted for 21.2% of 
all US imports in 2018 (The People’s Republic of China, 2020). Research discusses the high 
levels of trade with China and the impact this has on the amount of counterfeit goods entering 
the United States. The high level of counterfeiting in China is due to the considerable amount of 
outsourcing taking place there, China’s high level of organized crime, the lack of intellectual 
property rights in China, and the willingness of Chinese consumers to buy counterfeit goods 
(Chaudhry, 2009). 
Mainland China and Hong Kong dominate the world of counterfeit goods and they 
remain the primary source of counterfeit and pirated goods seizures in the United States. In 2019, 
The People’s Republic of China was at fault for a total of 66% of all counterfeit seizures in the 
US, a total estimated value of over $1B in counterfeit goods (US Customs and Border Protection, 
2019). In 2018, Mainland China accounted for 46% of total seizures with Hong Kong coming in 
at a close second at 41% (Homeland Security, 2018). The sharp increase of 20% in counterfeit 
seizures coming from China, correlates to the beginning of the tariff war between the Trump 
Administration and China. 
In March 2018, a report by the United States Trade Representative concluded that China 
was conducting unfair trade practices. That same day, the war on tariffs began. Figure 2, from 
BBC News, gives a visual of the tariffs placed on China and the retaliatory tariffs imposed on the 
US in 2018 and 2019. The United States is currently imposing tariffs on more than $360B worth 
of Chinese imports, 25% tariff on $250B and 7.5% on $112B (York, 2020). China has retaliated 
and currently holds tariffs on approximately $75B of US goods at a rate of 2.5% and 5% (York, 
2020). So what effect do these tariffs have on US consumers in the market for counterfeit goods? 
2.3 Consumer Role 
Consumers play a vital role in deciding the amount of counterfeit goods being imported 
into the United States; with fluctuating preferences and changes in income, consumer demand for 
counterfeit goods has increased in the last few decades. Previous research examines the complex 
purchasing process that involves: consumer-brand relationships, personality traits, impulse buys, 
conforming to social norms, etc., (Randhawa, Calantone, & Voorhees, 2015) and explains how 
understanding the connection between a consumer and a brand is vital when it comes to 
combating luxury brand counterfeiting. If a consumers main goal is to comply with social norms 
and find themselves in the ‘in crowd,' they will go to whatever lengths they deem necessary 
including deliberately purchasing counterfeit goods. This is a red flag when it comes to the fight 
against counterfeit goods. If consumers are always going to demand fake goods, nothing the 
government or firms do will make a difference. 
Counterfeiting can either be deceptive, consumers unknowingly purchase a counterfeit 
good because they cannot easily distinguish it from a genuine item; or non-deceptive, consumers 
knowingly purchase a product that is fake (Grossman & Shapiro, 1988). Consumers who 
deliberately purchase counterfeit goods do so for price affordability and to boost their 
socioeconomic status. Some economists have questioned whether counterfeiting is creating real 
losses since the consumers who are purchasing counterfeit goods are doing so due to their 
inability to afford the genuine product, and there is no guarantee they would contribute to the real 
market if the counterfeit good did not exist (Chaudry, 2009). As legitimate companies work to 
combat counterfeiters by making their products harder to replicate, ultimately increasing the 
price per item, consumers find themselves hunting for cheaper alternatives which are often 
counterfeit goods. 
2.4 Combatting Counterfeiting 
As previously mentioned, counterfeit goods are a risk to consumers, employees of 
legitimate companies, brand trust, and even source countries as they may see a reduction in on 
long term foreign direct investment due to counterfeit activity (Chaudry, 2009). Protection from 
counterfeiting ranges from the front lines with US Customs and Border Protection; to US laws 
like the Tariff Act of 1930, the Lanham Act, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, and the 
Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act of 2006. See the article Preserving Intellectual 
Property Rights (Chaudry, 2009) for an in-depth look at the various approaches to fighting 
counterfeiters and the most frequently used tactics. 
With the numerous laws and international agreements in the fight to end the production 
of counterfeit goods, educating the consumer does not seem to get the attention it deserves. 
Current literature focuses on US industries protecting their products by making them more 
difficult to replicate and using track and trace technology; however, the consumer needs to be 
aware of the risks with buying, knowingly or unknowingly, fake goods. The article, Strategies to 
detect and reduce counterfeiting activity by Barry Berman, was one of the few that explained the 
education process needed to make the public aware of the signs of counterfeit goods. He also 
explained the responsibility of marketers and how advertising campaigns that explain the 
financial risks and safety to consumers, would benefit the fight to end counterfeiting. Berman 
points out that an effective strategy to detect and reduce counterfeiting activity has several key 
components including; the importance of early detection, firms budgeting for counterfeit 
deterrence and the removal of counterfeit merchandise from the market, the firms ability to 
monitor the internet and manage outsourcing, and consumer education. 
The US Food and Drug Administration, as well as, US Customs and Border Protection, 
have created public service announcements to inform the public of the dangers of counterfeit 
goods. The US is doing a great deal to combat counterfeiters, but there are many more resources 
that can be utilized. Aggressive advertising can be used to explain how purchasing counterfeit 
goods often leads to the funding of organized crime and drug trafficking. Consumers do not have 
the realistic picture of the connection between their fake Louis Vuitton purse and the direct 
impact that purchase has on organized crime in the country it was produced in. The fight against 
counterfeit goods needs to take an aggressive approach to advertising, similar to the anti-tobacco 
ads of the late 1990s. Future research should examine the effect of shock advertising what effect 
there is if consumers are constantly bombarded with the truth behind counterfeit goods, how 
likely would they be to deliberately purchase them. 
Berman discusses an early warning system that alerts firms that counterfeit goods exist 
for their products; however, he states that an important component of such a system is for final 
consumers to report the suspected goods. This is putting a certain level of responsibility on the 
consumer to report suspected counterfeit goods, which they may not be aware of. An early 
warning system was not common among other research, but it should be implemented in the 
world of e-commerce. If consumers were asked if the item they purchased is a suspected 
counterfeit good every time they shopped online, companies would have an immediate 
notification and a better chance of tracking down counterfeiters. 
3. Models and Data
Table 1 is a collection of fiscal year seizures from the US Customs and Border Protection 
annual Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Reports. This data shows the amount of seizures 
each year from 2013 to 2019; with the total estimated manufacturer’s retail price (MSRP), or 
value, of the seized items. The table also includes the most common product that was seized and 
what percent of total seizures that product accounts for. Finding the percent change of seizures 
from one year to the next shows the increase, and decrease, of seizures over time. A key figure is 
the decrease from 2018 to 2019 of 18.4% during the tariff wars between the US and China, and 
interestingly, Apparel and Accessories is no longer the front runner in product segment for 
counterfeit seizures. 
Table 2 is a collection of data from the World Bank showing the import tariffs placed on 
Textiles and Clothing from China from 2013 to 2018, matching the years of seizure data from 
Table 1. Year 2019 data was not available on the site; however, below the table I have included 
data on the tariffs imposed on China in 2019 and 2020. The Trump Administration imposed 15% 
tariffs on $120B worth of goods from China in 2019, then reduced that tariff to 7.5% in 2020. It 
is difficult to find data on the exact product segment; therefore, referencing Figure 3, we see that 
there are two categories for apparel. One category has a tariff of 18.7% and the other is 15.8%. 
Apparel is a high tariff product segment, so I will use the rate of 15% for 2019 and assume a 
drop to 7.5% in 2020 to match the Trump Administration decisions. 
I am focusing on the Textiles and Clothing product market since Apparel and Clothing 
has consecutively been the leading product of counterfeit seizures, and the purpose of this data is 
to observe the effect of import tariffs on counterfeit goods entering the United States. 
Table 3 is a collection of data from the International Trade Administration, on imports of 
Apparel from China. We can assume that the level of counterfeit goods entering the US follows 
the fluctuation in imports; therefore, I will use this data to measure the impact of tariffs on the 
level of imports from China.  
Figure 1 is a graph of the US and China trade deficit mentioned previously in this paper. 
Figure Two is a visual of the dollar value of the US imposed tariffs on imported Chinese goods, 
as well as, the retaliatory tariffs from China from July 2018 to June 2019. This timeline shows 
the escalation in the tariff wars previously mentioned in this paper. 
Figure 3, from an article by PEW Research (DeSilver, 2018), shows that the largest 
categories of US imports tend to have relatively low tariff rates, with the exception of ‘Apparel 
and clothing accessories’. The purpose of including this chart is to show that the two categories 
of ‘Apparel and clothing accessories’ accounted for $80.6B worth of imports in 2017, making up 
3.5% of total imports, with nearly $64B of those imports subject to duty. The average tariffs on 
the ‘Apparel and clothing accessories’ category were 18.7% and 15.8% (knitted or crocheted vs 
not knitted or crocheted); these two rates were the highest out of the hundreds of import 
categories for goods entering the US. Footwear is the other category to notice in this chart 
because it is one of the most popular items being seized, after apparel, for counterfeit goods by 
US Customs and Border Protection every year. This chart shows that nearly 95% of footwear 
entering the US is subject to duty at a rate of 11.9%. This chart connects the two highest tariff 
rates to two of the most popular products that are subject to counterfeiting. 
Figure 4 is a scatter plot that shows the correlation between the annual seizure data in 
Table 1, and the import tariff rates from Table 2. This scatter plot explains that an increase in 
tariffs correlates to a decrease in counterfeit goods seizures. 
4. Results
This research shows that an inverse relationship exists between import tariffs placed on 
China in the Apparel (Clothing and Textiles) product segment, and the amount of counterfeit 
goods seizures in the United States. Based on the data presented, as import tariffs rise, 
counterfeit goods seizures fall. I am equating seizures to the level of counterfeit goods entering 
the United States. This phenomenon follows the inverse effect that tariffs normally have on 
imports; tariffs increase the price of imported goods and domestic consumers are left paying 
higher prices as a result therefore demanding less imported goods. As stated previously, customs 
seizure data can fluctuate based on an increase in border security; however, for this paper I am 
holding all other variables constant and purely observing the relationship between counterfeit 
seizures and tariffs. 
Table 1 shows the decline in seizures from 2018 to 2019 of 18.4% which correlates to an 
increase in tariffs from 10.92% to 15%. In 2019, the decline in imports of Apparel from China is 
around 36% and we can assume this reduction in trade is also a reduction in the ability to move 
counterfeit goods into the United States. Figure 4 includes the R-squared value of 0.0417. R-
Squared is a statistical measure that explains to what extent the variance of one variable (import 
tariffs), explains the variance of the second variable (seizures). R-Squared is always between 0 
and 100% with 0% indicating that the model explains none of the variability of the response data 
around its mean; therefore, the R-Squared value of 0.0417 shows the very minimal effect that 
tariffs have on counterfeit seizures. 
5. Conclusion
Higher tariffs on Apparel items have reduced the amount of imports into the United 
States as well as the amount of counterfeit good seizures; however, there is not a strong enough 
relationship of tariff rates to counterfeit good seizures to state that a decrease in seizures is solely 
due to an increase in tariffs. Prior to this research I assumed that an increase in tariffs would 
increase the amount of counterfeit good seizures because domestic prices will increase with 
higher tariffs, and consumers will search for cheaper alternatives that are usually fake. I assumed 
that the demand for counterfeit goods would rise with an increase in tariffs because consumers 
cannot afford, or do not want to pay, the price for legitimate goods. It is difficult to measure the 
definite impact that raising or lowering import tariffs will have on the amount of counterfeit 
goods entering the United States because it is an illegal industry and widely untraceable. It is 
safe to assume that increasing tariffs, resulting in higher prices for goods, will decrease the level 
of imports into the United States, real or fake, and reduce the burden on US Customs and Border 
Protection in their effort to find counterfeit goods. 
In order to combat the inflow of counterfeit goods into the United States, consumers need 
to be smarter. The government, industry leaders, and firms must all play their part in educating 
the consumer and making them aware of the effects of purchasing counterfeit goods. Counterfeit 
goods stop at the consumer; if there is no demand for the fake goods then they will cease to exist. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Fiscal Year Seizures 
FY Seizures
Percent Change 
from Previous 
Year
Total Estimated 
Manufacturer’s 
Suggested Retail 
Price (MSRP)
Top Product Seized 
(% of all Seizures)
2019 27,599 -18.4% $1.5B Watches and 
Jewelry (15%)
2018 33,810 -0.1% $1.4B Apparel/
Accessories (18%)
2017 34,143 8.2% $1.2B Apparel/
Accessories (15%)
2016 31,560 9.3% $1.4B Apparel/
Accessories (20%)
2015 28,865 24.7% $1.3B Apparel/
Accessories (22%)
2014 23,140 -5% $1.2B Apparel/
Accessories (28%)
2013 24,361 — $1.7B Apparel/
Accessories (35%)
Table 2 
Textiles and Clothing Import Tariff’s Placed on China 
*Data for 2019 was not available on this website; however, on February 14, 2020, the US 
reduced the 15% tariffs on Chinese goods by half to 7.5% (York, 2020). 
FY
Total Import Value of 
Textiles and Clothing 
(Thousands)
Percent of Imports that 
are Textiles and 
Clothing
Import Tariff Imposed on 
Textiles and Clothing
2020 No data No data 7.5%*
2019 No data No data 15%*
2018 $42,479,673.90 7.54% 10.92%
2017 $40,849,010.19 7.77% 10.61%
2016 $41,243,182.43 8.57% 11.01%
2015 $44,601,796.97 8.85% 11.06%
2014 $43,036,931.73 8.85% 11.02%
2013 $40,714,714.38 9.25% 10.98%
Table 3 
Apparel Imports to US from China 
Year Percent Change in Imports from Year-to-Date (Jan)
Jan 2019-Jan 2020 -36.09%
Jan 2018-Jan 2019 8.53%
Jan 2017-Jan 2018 -7.24%
Jan 2016-Jan 2017 4.63%
Jan 2015-Jan 2016 2.67%
 Jan 2014-Jan 2015 -10.30%
Jan 2013-Jan 2014 3.90%
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